

OPERATIONS (RESPONSE) - INCIDENTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

SUMMARY

1. This report outlines details of incidents of special interest for the last quarter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. That Members note the contents of this report as a quarterly update of Incidents of Special Interest.

RESPONSE

3. Incidents of Special Interest are included as Appendix 1 to this paper.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

4. The activities outlined above all contribute to the delivery of the strategic plan.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

5. None at this time. All activities are met within agreed budgets.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

6. None arising from this report.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

7. None arising from this report.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

8. All managed within the Risk and Opportunity Management process.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

9. None.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

10. None at this time.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION

11. For HFA information and discussion only.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

12. None.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

13. That Members note the contents of this report as a quarterly update of Incidents of Special Interest.

D SANDERS

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DS
11 September 2013

INCIDENT: Creyke Beck Sub Station, Park Lane, Cottingham,
Large Fire – Public Utilities

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 13.59 26th April 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 14.01 26th April 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 14.10 26th April 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 3 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 8 Pumping Appliance
Command Unit
Water Support Unit
3 Prime Mover

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: Foam Branches

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 5, 4, 5, 5, 5, 2, 2, 4, 6, 2, 3, 2, 5, 3,
2, 2 + 5 FDS Officers = 62

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: 5

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 19.14 26th April 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 16.56 29th April 2013

SMOKE ALARM: Fitted and Operated

SUMMARY:

The initial call received by Service Control suggested that the incident was on the railway line near Dunswell Lane. This resulted in the initial three appliances being mobilised to this location, however, the first appliance in attendance relayed information as to the true location to the oncoming appliances.

The Officer in Charge liaised with an onsite engineer at the substation and it became evident that the fire involved a large electrical transformer holding 10,000 litres of oil. The transformer was located in a bund but a gate valve in the bund wall was open with the possibility of contamination of a local beck. The OIC made pumps six and requested the Environment Pod and Water Support Unit. A request to ready large quantities of foam was also sent.

At this stage no fire fighting actions were possible due to all transformers on the site being live. Liaison with onsite experts resulted in work commencing to isolate and earth the affected transformer. During this time crews laid out fire fighting equipment ready for a foam attack and also damned off the beck to prevent contamination. It was also confirmed that the oil in the transformer was pure oil to insulate the transformer, with no Polychlorinated Biphenyls. Site staff identified a safe approach route for fire fighting teams and fenced off the route to protect crews from live equipment.

The damage to the transformer resulted in large volumes of thick black smoke which affected the full length of Dunswell Lane, preventing people reaching their homes and affecting the railway line. 3 top tier COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) sites also lost power for a short while as a result of the fire.

A precautionary Gold Command was called. Representatives from the Environmental agency, Food Standards agency and Yorkshire Water attended the site and liaised with HFRS and site personnel.

Once confirmation was received that the isolation was complete, a foam attack was commenced on the affected transformer. The fire was extinguished following the application of approx. 2000 litres of foam and shortly after residents were allowed to return to their houses.

The incident was then left with National Grid personnel who maintained a fire watch on the affected transformer, which was still hot, with some pockets of oil still burning but inaccessible. An amount of foam was left on site and arrangements put in place for a pump to attend if necessary. Three further calls were received over the weekend and crews attended and reapplied foam to the transformer.

The extent of the fire and the risk from live equipment prevented a normal fire investigation, however National Grid personnel are carrying out an in depth investigation. The cause of the fire has been recorded as accidental, and it is believed that an explosion was caused by a High Voltage bush fault.

INCIDENT: Waste Water Treatment Works, Hull Road, Saltend
Outdoor Machinery

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 07.26 19th June 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 07.26 19th June 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 07.38 19th June 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 2 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 3 Pumping Appliances
Aerial Ladder Platform

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 3 Main Jets

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 5, 5, 5, 5, 2, 2 + 4 FDS
Officers = 28

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: 2

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 11.50 19th June 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 20.43 20th June 2013

SMOKE ALARM: N/A

SUMMARY:

On arrival the crews were met with an odour control unit well alight and so the Watch Manager made pumps four and requested a Hazmat Officer to attend, as there were chemical tanks in the vicinity. The fire involved a number of vessels containing carbon pellets which act as a filtration system and are highly flammable. The construction of these vessels and associated pipework was also flammable as it was made from glass reinforced plastic which contributed to the intensity of the fire.

Crews were involved in setting up main jets and ground monitors and also locating additional water supplies. Once these were established, the fire was quickly brought under control. The Hazmat Advisor liaised with the Incident Commander and Tactical Advisor to ensure that any potential chemical or environmental risks were dealt with appropriately. The Environmental Agency were informed and later attended.

An Aerial Ladder Platform was requested to assist with extinguishing the fire and damping down which was achieved with the assistance of works personnel using a teleporter under the supervision of the Fire Service.

After the crews initially left the scene a three further inspections took place over the next 24 hours due to the difficulty in damping down the carbon material still contained in one of the tanks, which was inaccessible to the teleporter.

One of the two odour control units suffered severe damage, although damage was kept to a minimum by the prompt actions of Fire Service personnel.

Following Fire Investigation the cause of the fire has been recorded as accidental due to overheating.

INCIDENT: Low Santon Farm, Dawes Lane, High Santon
Large Barn Fire

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 05.23 2nd July 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 05.26 2nd July 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 05.35 2nd July 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 3 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 2 Pumping Appliances

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 2 Main Jets

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 6, 5, 4, 5, 6 + 5 FDS Officers = 31

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: N/A

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 08.49 2nd July 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 12.32 2nd July 2013

SMOKE ALARM: No Smoke Detector Fitted

SUMMARY:

On arrival the crews were met with a Dutch barn containing approximately 400 bales of straw, well alight. The fire was threatening to spread to the adjacent buildings and two static caravans, which were close to the barn. The static caravans had already been evacuated, prior to the crews arrival.

Due to the remote location of the incident, knowledge of local hydrant supplies and the extent of the fire, the Watch Manager made pumps five.

LPG cylinders which provided a gas supply to the static caravans were quickly identified and removed to a safe distance. Initial tactics were then to prevent fire spread to the static caravans and adjacent farm buildings and also to establish a suitable water supply. Once under control, tactics shifted to a controlled burn with the focus still on prevention of spread. A mechanical digger was utilised to create a break between the end of the barn and the static caravan.

A local lake was identified as a suitable open water supply and once this was established, resources at the incident were scaled down.

The damage was mainly contained to the barn, with a caravan suffering some heat damage. Sheep which were kept in a nearby barn had been released away from the fire prior to the crew's arrival, although fright and disorientation caused two to run into the barn, rather than the nearby field. These were later confirmed to have perished.

Following Fire Investigation the cause of the fire has been recorded as accidental due to carelessly discarded smoking materials.

INCIDENT: M180 Eastbound, Junct 4 – 5, A180
Multiple Vehicle Road Traffic Collision

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 15.36 16th July 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 15.39 16th July 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 15.49 16th July 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 3 Pumping Appliances
Rescue Support Unit

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 2 Pumping Appliance

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: N/A

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 4, 5, 2, 2, 4, 5 + 4 FDS Officers
= 26

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: N/A

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 17.42 16th July 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 19.07 16th July 2013

SMOKE ALARM: N/A

SUMMARY:

Three appliances, a Rescue Support Unit and one Officer were initially sent to this incident, following reports of two lorries involved in a road traffic collision. Upon arrival, it was immediately apparent that the initial information received by Service Control was not fully accurate as the incident comprised of four separate RTC's covering a distance of 800 metres on the Eastbound carriageway, between Junctions 4 and 5. Two of the collisions, one involving two HGV's, did not require assistance or resources from the Service. Activities focussed on one female trapped in a car with severe head injuries and a lorry driver trapped in his cab approximately 100 metres further along the carriageway.

The initial attendance was quickly increased as a result of the initial assessment, with a further two appliances and a further Officer being requested to attend.

The incident was sectorised to allow proper control to be maintained at the two areas of activity. Cutting equipment was deployed to ensure the controlled released of both casualties. The female casualty was released and subsequently airlifted to hospital following further treatment at the scene by paramedics.

The male lorry driver was not released from his cab until later, due to the severe nature of his entrapment. The specialist equipment carried on the RSU was invaluable in securing his release. The extrication was conducted in a coordinated manner in very difficult circumstances, with the three blue light services working closely together. This casualty was also taken from the scene via air ambulance.

