

OPERATIONS (RESPONSE) - INCIDENTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

SUMMARY

1. This report outlines details of incidents of special interest for the last quarter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. That Members note the contents of this report as a quarterly update of Incidents of Special Interest.

RESPONSE

3. Incidents of Special Interest are included as Appendix 1 to this paper.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

4. The activities outlined above all contribute to the delivery of the strategic plan.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

5. None at this time. All activities are met within agreed budgets.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

6. None arising from this report.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

7. None arising from this report.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

8. All managed within the Risk and Opportunity Management process.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

9. None.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

10. None at this time.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION

11. For HFA information and discussion only.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

12. None.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

13. That Members note the contents of this report as a quarterly update of Incidents of Special Interest.

D SANDERS

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DS
24 February 2014

INCIDENT: Eagle House, Fleetgate, Barton upon Humber
Large Building Fire

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 03.56 6th November 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 03.58 6th November 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 04.05 6th November 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 2 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 3 Pumping Appliances
Aerial Ladder Platform

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 3 Main Jets

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 6, 5, 5, 4, 3, 2, + 2 FDS Officers
= 27

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: N/A

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 08.01 6th November 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 14.24 6th November 2013

SMOKE ALARM: N/A

SUMMARY:

On arrival the Officer in Charge immediately made pumps four and requested an aerial ladder platform due to the extent and severity of the fire within the roof of a large derelict building, which had formally been a residential home.

Although a jet was used immediately it was apparent that the fire would only be brought under control and extinguished with the use of an aerial appliance. Entry and access into the premises was clearly too hazardous and likely to prove ineffective and so a defensive position was established throughout the incident.

During external fire fighting operations a fire fighter sustained an injury as a result of a small amount of spalling plaster from the soffit area falling from height, however head protection was being worn. The fire fighter was attended to by the Ambulance crew at the scene and was conveyed to hospital as a precaution.

Approximately 80% of the roof area was destroyed by fire and severe damage was sustained to the first floor area, however the main structure of the building was saved and fire spread to adjoining premises was averted.

Fire investigations have concluded that the fire was accidental, caused as a result of a stray firework.

INCIDENT: Hessle Road, Hull
Large Laundrette Fire

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 11.17 11th November 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 11.18 11th November 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 11.23 11th November 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 2 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 10 Pumping Appliances
Aerial Ladder Platform

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 4 Main Jets

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 5, 5, 4, 2, 6, 6, 5, 2, 5, 4, 4,
5, 5 + 7 FDS Officers = 65

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: 6

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 19.10 11th November 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 01.55 12th November 2013

SMOKE ALARM: N/A

SUMMARY:

On arrival the Officer in Charge was confronted with an extended three storey property consisting of a laundrette with offices and storage spaces upstairs. A large amount of dense smoke was exiting from windows and doors. The OIC made pumps three and quickly accounted for all persons. Shortly after pumps were increased to five.

Operations commenced at both the front and rear of the building, to access and extinguish the suspected cause, but were hampered by the continued amount of smoke being generated by a seemingly small fire. The incident was sectorised and a breathing apparatus team at the rear of the building discovered that the mains gas pipe had ruptured before the isolation point; escaping gas had ignited. Transco were requested but could not isolate the gas immediately due to establishing the exact location of the service feed.

During attempts to bring down the ceiling, it was discovered that straw had been used as insulation, resulting in fire spread to other sections of the property.

The aerial ladder platform had been requested and operations from there indicated that the central roof beams within the rear extension, had begun to distort. With the potential for roofing collapse at the rear, all internal operations to this part of the building ceased.

A structural engineer was requested, and it was decided due to the impractical nature of internal operations, the only option to stop fire spread would be the partial demolition of the building. Following the demolition of the extension, it was obvious that the fire would have spread to other parts of the building, had those actions not been taken.

The cause has been recorded as accidental, suspected spontaneous combustion.

INCIDENT: TATA Steel, Scunthorpe
Large Industrial Fire

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 01.56 22nd November 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 01.59 22nd November 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 02.02 22nd November 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 3 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 6 Pumping Appliances
Aerial Ladder Platform
Command Unit

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 1 Hose Reel, 8 Dry Powder Extinguishers

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 5, 4, 5, 2, 2, 6, 2, 3, 6, 6, 6 + 7 FDS Officers = 54

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: 2

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 05.02 22nd November 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 06.38 22nd November 2013

SMOKE ALARM: N/A

SUMMARY:

On attendance at the Steel Works, the Officer in Charge liaised with TATA Management and the Watch Manager of HFR Solutions (TATA Emergency Response) to confirm details of what had occurred and the appropriate response. It was confirmed that an explosion had occurred and the aerial ladder platform was requested. Four TATA personnel were missing but were quickly accounted for with three people being transported to hospital with radiated heat burns.

It was vitally important that TATA staff were able to regain entry to the power plant control room to conduct a damage assessment, as the accident had the potential to cause the shutdown of all site operations, with the possibility of further implications. HFRS Officers instigated a safe plan to gain access to the control room and conduct a scene assessment. As the damage was not as extensive as first feared, a total shutdown was not required, however one turbine had exploded and was in flames. A second turbine was also involved and a conditioning unit was also on fire. The blast from the explosion had also caused damage to the roof.

Further appliances were requested, so at its height eight pumps were in attendance, along with an appliance crewed with five HRS Solutions personnel. To mitigate damage and prevent a possible further escalation that could have had serious consequences, it was necessary for firefighters to enter the risk area to extinguish the fires. This was safely achieved using dry powder extinguishers provided by the site and HFRS hose reels.

The cause of the incident was deemed to be damage to the blades of turbine number five, the subsequent vibration causing oil feed pipes to fail, spraying atomised oil into the atmosphere and onto the hot surfaces of the turbine leading to the initial ignition. It is believed the initial ignition and fire ball caused damage resulting in the release of more atomised oil which then resulted in a second fireball.

INCIDENT: Navenby Grove, Sedgebrook Grove, Hull
Fire Fatality – Dwelling Fire

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 16.27 23rd November 2013

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 16.29 23rd November 2013

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 16.34 23rd November 2013

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 3 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: N/A

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 1 Main Jet

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 5, 4, 4 + 2 FDS Officers = 15

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: 2

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 16.50 23rd November 2013

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 18.02 23rd November 2013

SMOKE ALARM: Fitted and Activated

SUMMARY:

On arrival the occupier of the small bungalow was being assisted from the property by neighbours and was outside. He was led towards the ambulance but collapsed at the front gate to the property.

Fire fighters wearing breathing apparatus were committed into the bungalow and soon discovered the main seat of fire in the bedroom adjacent to the bed. The rapid expansion of the fire was caused by burning to a nearby tube connected to an oxygen cylinder, used to assist the occupier with breathing. The fire was extinguished using a high pressure hose reel and the property was quickly vented by using a ventilation fan.

The bedroom was severely affected by fire and there was some burning to the passageway ceiling. The remainder of the bungalow suffered extensive damage from the products of combustion.

It was believed that the occupier was in the bedroom when the fire started. The smoke alarm activated and alerted a Telecare Service Provider who advised the occupier to leave the property. Contact was made with the occupier's named contact, a nearby neighbour. Although the occupier was reluctant to leave the property he was eventually assisted out by his neighbours. Following the collapse, he was treated in an ambulance by ambulance staff, but unfortunately after being taken to hospital was pronounced dead.

Following fire investigations, the cause has been recorded as accidental.

INCIDENT: Ings Farm, Southfield Lane, A163, Seaton Ross
Large Barn Fire

DATE AND TIME OF CALL: 20.38 5th January 2014

MOBILE TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 20.42 5th January 2014

ARRIVAL TIME OF FIRST APPLIANCE: 20.54 5th January 2014

INITIAL FIRE APPLIANCE ATTENDANCE: 2 Pumping Appliances

ADDITIONAL APPLIANCE MOBILISED: 4 Pumping Appliances

OTHER FRS RESOURCES ATTENDED: N/A

METHOD OF EXTINCTION: 3 Main Jets

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ATTENDING: 5, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6 + 6 FDS
Officers = 41

NUMBER OF BREATHING APPARATUS SETS USED: 4

TIME INCIDENT UNDER CONTROL: 04.09 6th January 2014

TIME OF RETURN OF LAST APPLIANCE: 09.59 6th January 2014

SMOKE ALARM: N/A

SUMMARY:

This incident involved two barns in a remote location which had poor water supplies. The initial Officer in Charge used the limited water supply and utilised high pressure hose reels rather than main jets, as well as making pumps four to assist with the water. This was later increased to six pumps for ferrying the water from the nearest hydrant.

The buildings were fully involved in fire on the crews' initial attendance, and the extent of the fire meant that saving the two barns was no longer a possibility. Instead stopping fire spread to the surrounding buildings was the main objective. Once that was achieved then establishing and maintaining sufficient and consistent water supplies was organised to attack the fire in the barns. The fire was then tackled defensively with up to 4 main jets, depending on the weather, wind direction and state of the fire.

At the closing stages of the fire, the following day, a mechanical digger assisted with clearing the debris and parts of the fire were allowed to smoulder and burn out.

Two barns, about 20m x 25m were fully destroyed in the fire, as was a tractor, with various tools, equipment and supplies. Two horses perished and the occupier attended hospital for treatment for burns. The south barn contained an external diesel tank, holding 500 litres of diesel and although this was protected and was not involved in the fire, the fuel would probably be contaminated.

A Fire Investigation Officer attended and established the cause as accidental, most probably due to a large amount of animal manure left undisturbed for too long a period.

